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Recent Developments

COOK v. GRIERSON:

Pursuant to the Maryland Slayer Rule, Grandchildren Have no
Right to Inherit from their Grandfather's Intestate Estate when
Death is a Result of an Act of Patricide by the Children's Father
By: Jigita A. Patel
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland

held that grandchildren of a decedent who dies intestate cannot
inherit from the decedent when the children's father is precluded
from inheriting because of the Slayer'S Rule. Cook v. Grierson, 380 Md.
502, 845 A.2d 1231 (2004). In so holding, the court found that
grandchildren have no independent claim against a grandparent's
estate because they were not "issue" within the meaning of the
Maryland intestacy statute since their father was still alive. ld. at 51314, 845 A.2d at 1237-38. Thus, pursuant to the Slayer'S Rule, which
specifically prohibits "anyone claiming through the slayer" from
sharing the decedent's estate, the grandchildren were denied any
share in their grandfather's estate. ld. at 503,845 A.2d at 1231.
In January 2002, Frederick Charles Grierson, Jr. ("Frederick")
died intestate, survived by his widow, his son Charles, and three
grandchildren. Frederick died as a result of multiple stab wounds
inflicted by his son, Charles. Charles pled guilty to second-degree
murder and was sentenced to thirty years in prison.
The decedent's widow, Deborah Grierson ("Deborah"), as
personal representative of her husband's estate, filed a notice of
disinheritance in the Orphans' Court for Anne Arundel County
("Orphans' Court"), asserting that Charles was not entitled to a share
in his father's estate under the Maryland Slayer'S Rule. Subsequent to
this action, the grandchildren petitioned the Orphans' Court to
declare their rights to inherit a share of the decedent's estate. The
Orphans' Court denied the grandchildren'S claims, and the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County affirmed this ruling. Thereafter, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior to any
proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
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The court of appeals began its analysis with a review of the
Maryland Slayer's Rule. ld. at 505-09,845 A.2d at 1232-35. The court
acknowledged that Maryland does not have a slayer statute; rather,
the judiciary has formulated a Slayer's Rule in Maryland through case
law. ld. at 505-06, 845 A.2d at 1233. The purpose· of the Rule is to
prevent someone from "profiting by his own fraud ... or acquiring
property by his own crime." ld. at 50S, 845 A.2d at 1233.
The present court relied on an interpretation of the Slayer's
Rule as enunciated in the seminal Maryland case, Price v. Hitaffer, 164
Md. 50S, 165 A. 470 (1933), in which the court concluded a murderer
failed to acquire a beneficial interest in the victim's estate due to his
murderous acts. ld. at 506, 845 A.2d at 1233-34. Next, the court
summarized the Slayer's Rule as set forth in Ford v. Ford, 307 Md. lOS,
111-12,512 A.2d 389, 392-93 (1986), in which the court opined:
"a person who intentionally and
feloniously kills another may not share
in the distribution of the decedent's
estate as an heir by the way of statutes
of descent and distribution, or as a
devisee or a legatee under the
decedent's will . . .. These· principles
also apply to anyone claiming through
or under the slayer."
ld. at 508-09, 845 A.2d at 1235 (quoting Ford, 307 Md. at 111-12, 512

A.2d at 392-93).
The grandchildren offered two theories for claiming a right to
inherit. Cook, 380 Md. at 510-11, 845 A.2d at 1263. First, they
proposed Charles be treated as having predeceased the victim,
thereby making the grandchildren "issue" pursuant to the intestacy
statutes. ld. Second, they asserted a constructive trust theory,
whereby Charles' interest would be held in trust for the benefit of the
grandchildren. ld. The court flatly denied the constructive trust
theory in light of the Price holding that a murderer never acquires an
interest in the decedent's estate. ld.
In response to the grandchildren's first theory, the court noted
that, out of the forty-two states that have adopted slayer statutes,
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twenty-seven statutes treat the slayer as having predeceased the
decedent, thereby distributing the slayer's share of the estate to the
slayer's heirs. Id. at 510-11, 845 A.2d at 1235-36. The remaining
statutes regard the slayer as having disclaimed his share, or provide
for other heirs of the decedent to split the slayer's portion. Id.
Because there is no statute or legislative intent that elucidates the
treatment of a slayer in Maryland, the court of appeals relied on the
reasoning of the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Carter v. Hutchison,
707 S.W.2d 533 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). Cook, 380 Md. at 511-12, 845
A.2d at 1236-37.
Carter involved the efforts of a great-grandchild to inherit
from his great-grandfather who was slain by the great-grandchild's
father. Id. The Carter court recognized two goals of the Tennessee
slayer statute: (1) forfeiture of all rights by the slayer in the decedent's
estate, and (2) property distribution pursuant to the Tennessee
intestate statute. Id. After the slayer forfeited his rights in the victim's
estate, the court distributed the property to the slayer's child because,
pursuant to Tennessee's intestacy statute, the child qualified as
"issue." Id. The Tennessee intestate statute defined "issue" as "all
direct, lineal descendents of the deceased." Id.
Applying Tennessee's construction of the slayer statute to the
present matter, the court of appeals treated Charles as having
forfeited his rights in the decedent's property. Id., 380 Md. at 512-13,
845 A.2d at 1237-38. Thereafter, the court looked to Maryland's
intestacy statute to determine whether Frederick's grandchildren
would independently qualify as "issue" of the decedent.
Id.
Recognizing that only the Maryland legislature has the authority to
regulate the distribution of property, the court noted the Maryland
intestacy statute's definition of "issue" explicitly excludes lineal
descendents of a living descendent. Id. Thus, because Charles was
still alive, the court determined that the grandchildren were not
"issue" within the meaning of the Maryland intestacy statute. Id. at
513, 845 A.2d at 1237. Therefore, the court concluded that the
grandchildren could not independently claim a share in their
grandfather's estate pursuant to the intestacy statute. Id.
In assessing its decision, the court of appeals stated that
prohibiting the grandchildren from inheriting is not analogous to
punishing them for the acts of their father. Id. at 514, 845 A.2d at
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1237-38. The court reasoned, if Frederick had died naturally, then
pursuant to the Maryland intestacy statute, only Frederick's surviving
spouse and his son, Charles, would inherit. ld. Thus, the court of
appeals determined, adopting the legal fiction that Charles had
predeceased his father would place the grandchildren, in a better
position than if their grandfather had died of natural causes. ld. In
conclusion, the court stated that a change in the statutes of descent
and distribution allowing children of the slayer to inherit "should
come from the legislature and not the judiciary." ld.
The interpretation of the Slayer's Rule by the court of appeals
in Cook summons the legislature to clarify and codify the Slayer's Rule
in Maryland so that an equitable solution is provided to the slayer's
children. The Cook court's ruling removes all possibility for the
slayer's children to inherit from their intestate ancestor. For instance,
under Cook's court interpretation of the Slayer's Rule, a slayer's child
in Maryland will never be able to inherit from any intestate ancestor if
the child's parent caused the ancestor's death, and the parent is alive
at the time of the ancestor's death. Conversely, if the ancestor had
died naturally, the children may likely inherit some share of the
ancestor's estate through their parents. Thus, to avoid punishing
slayer's children for the acts of their parents, the Maryland legislature
should either codify the Slayer's Rule, requiring the slayer be treated
as "predeceased," or change the definition of "issue."
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